The Myth of the Tragedy of the Commons - Government Regulation and Global Sustainability

by Saranya Anandakumar
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Private interest vs. public good. According to the “tragedy of the commons”, when individuals prioritize their self-interest and fail to use public resources sustainably these shared resources are pushed past their sustainable yield and depleted. Like a bucket in the rain, over time each droplet grows in size, with individuals taking more from publicly owned resources. In time, this leads to the bucket spilling over, and the resource is depleted: of no use to anyone.

In theory, such an explanation checks out, but in reality, the “tragedy of the commons” is quite uncommon if local communities are left to manage public resources. Analyst Elinor Ostrom found that in Nepal’s mountain regions over decades residents learned to distribute wood without exceeding carrying capacity. But when faced with the threat of deforestation resource management transferred to the local government. By imposing “individual-centered” regulations, the existing community-centered structure of resource management dissipated. In its place: competition favoring the exploitation of public ownership for individual gain. 
Oftentimes, government-implemented rules are poorly thought out or enforced leading to decreased sustainability. In Nepal, the practice of requiring permits to legally obtain wood was poorly enforced, leading many to illegally use timber in mass quantities. The system itself was easily circumvented, and the few following the rules lost out by doing so. What Nepal did enforce was the seizure of private land that was left unused for two or more years. Thus, property owners who responsibly let their land rest, to prevent depletion of nutrients, often lost their plots. Once more, those prioritizing sustainability lose in the competitive “individual-centered” environment created by government regulation. Thus, deforestation began accelerating in Nepal.
Though in theory communities have the ability to petition and lobby for changes in a flawed system, the bureaucracy of the government coupled with the difficulty of communicating information across a nation of remote regions, makes any community-driven changes unlikely. Thus in reality, post government forestry regulation, deforestation accelerated in Nepal.

Since Nepal villages could do it, the question then becomes, “Is overcoming the ‘tragedy of the commons’ feasible on a national or global scale?” The first problem comes in that, even on a much smaller scale, humans have no problem betraying one another for self-interested rationales. Take an auction of a precious work of art. The bidding starts at a reasonable price for the estimated value of the painting, but ten, or twenty bids in, the proposed cost is exorbitantly inflated. Still, bidders remain staunch in their resolve, despite knowing that the winner, whether it be themselves or someone else is being wholly overcharged. “Auctions incentivize truthfulness by forcing bidders to put money on their claims.” (Binmore, 2007). As per game theory, the selfish desire to win trumps any logical reservations about the unfair price tag or collective upset. Thus, the “tragedy of the commons” can only be overcome without regulation if, like in early Nepal, individuals have some sort of tie or connection to one another, like a real community. In essence, I believe that individuals can work together as a group, but a foundational bond is necessary to do so, and the larger a group becomes the harder this is to accomplish. Thus, I think that in the politically radicalized nationally-divided state of the world today, such a community is far from coming to fruition. Thus, internally-motivated action is infeasible unless it is done to solve small local issues like overfishing in a small town bay, not overfishing in the entire nation of China.

Though government regulation has its flaws, as I described in the Nepal example, in a capitalist society of monetary motivation there is no other real way. Take the issue of the mass emission of greenhouse gasses, aerosols, and CFCs into the atmosphere. The only thing that can stop corporations from cost-efficient yet environmentally destructive ways is to make those methods, namely fossil fuel burning, no longer cost-effective. The prevailing options are large government-issued fines or consumer action. Though the latter is in essence impracticable. In one IBM study of 16,000 participants, “Roughly 1 in 3 consumers say sustainable travel is a priority, ranking environmental impact factors over cost, convenience, and comfort in their purchase decisions” (Cheung, 2022). Still, 29% of U.S. Greenhouse Gas emissions are from transportation. Even if ⅓ of consumers reduce their emissions, they are far from erasing them as even the process of generating electricity for electric cars may involve the burning of fossil fuels like coal or natural gas (Electric Vehicle Myths | US EPA, 2023). And joint consumer action is limited in its effective decrease of emissions.
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Ultimately the problem with both government and consumer regulation of corporations, as Ostrom describes, is that neither understands the intricacies and needs of the corporations. However, in Gujarat, India the implementation of a voluntary cap-and-trade Surat Clean Air market by the government challenges this notion. In the market, the Gujarat government set an emissions “cap” and auctioned off permits allowing different tons of emissions under said cap. From there plants were allowed to “trade” these permits amongst themselves. The incentive to profit off of these trades led many plants to cut their emissions. The results thus far have shown industries using the market have decreased emissions by about 20% while operating costs and efficiency remain about the same. (Using Markets to Confront Pollution and Climate Change in India | EPIC, 2022). A more flexible system, wherein self-interest and monetary gain are used as a motive toward sustainability, seems to be the most realistic solution in a capitalist society where both are valued. Thus, government regulation may be a viable option for global sustainability. 


​References
Binmore, K. (2007). Game Theory: A Very Short Introduction. http://ci.nii.ac.jp/ncid/BA83551107
Electric Vehicle myths | US EPA. (2023, June 15). US EPA. https://www.epa.gov/greenvehicles/electric-vehicle-myths#:~:text=comparable%20gasoline%20vehicles.-,Myth%20%231%3A%20Electric%20vehicles%20are%20worse%20for%20the%20climate%20than,EVs)%20have%20no%20tailpipe%20emissions.
Jeung, C. (2022). 2022 sustainability consumer research: Sustainability and profitability. (n.d.). IBM. https://www.ibm.com/thought-leadership/institute-business-value/en-us/report/2022-sustainability-consumer-research
 Using Markets to Confront Pollution and Climate Change in India | EPIC. (2022, June 7). https://epic.uchicago.edu/insights/using-markets-to-confront-pollution-and-climate-change-in-india/